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In parallel with financial deepening, attention is increasingly being paid to the segment 
of the population that is not involved in formal financial intermediation. Some of these 
households typically have poor income situations, and therefore, due to their low 
creditworthiness, their demand for credit remains unmet. In our study, for the first 
time in the Hungarian academic literature, we attempt to estimate the magnitude of 
the spread of usury lending. Domestic responses to the Eurostat Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions were used to determine the order-of-magnitude of vulnerable, and 
thus potentially affected households. Based on our results, the proportion of Hungarian 
households that – due to their financial and housing conditions – are so vulnerable 
that they may be exposed, at least on an ad-hoc basis, to the risk of usury lending, 
can be estimated at between 3 and 13 per cent. In order to identify areas where usury 
lending is believed to be rife in the local community, we used as a basis the intersection 
of settlements lagging behind due to their economic-housing underdevelopment and 
districts with low (formal) credit penetration, based on the aggregate data from 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office and the Central Bank of Hungary. The areas 
most affected by usury lending may be the country border settlements in Borsod-
Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Hajdú-Bihar counties. This result is also 
supported by the regional distribution of available official statistics on criminal usury.
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1. Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, borrowing by the domestic household sector hit 
rock bottom in 2012, but since then we can talk about increasingly expansive credit 
issuance, which has affected both housing loans and consumer loans. However, 
the expansion of new loans was long offset by repayments of loans taken out 
before the crisis, and consequently the nominal credit-to-GDP ratio only began 
to increase in 2018. As the credit cycle progresses, with the cyclical deepening of 
financial intermediation, more and more attention is being paid to those segments 
of the population that are not yet involved in financial intermediation provided 
by the formal institutional system (i.e. do not use any services of the financial 
intermediation system).
The strata which are outside the realm of the banking system typically either have 
low incomes or cannot present verifiable income at all, and are thus not considered 
creditworthy under the current macroprudential (debt cap) regulations.1 Their lack 
of involvement is, on the one hand, a constraint on financial deepening in the long 
run and, on the other hand, it can cause acute social problems, as they do not 
enter the scope of either financial supervision or consumer protection. Due to 
their worse financial status, the demand for external funding for liquidity purpose 
may be increasingly present among these households, possibly through the use 
of informal channels. The most common manifestation of this in Hungary is usury 
lending, which is a short-term debt taken from a private person. It has typically an 
unrealistically high interest rate compared to credit market conditions.
Since usury lending is a legally prohibited activity, the recognition of its size at 
the level of the national economy is limited: neither creditors, nor debtors talk 
about it in surveys for statistical purposes, and “contracts” are not recorded in an 
accessible way.2 Our research, therefore, was focused on examining the population 
potentially exposed to non-bank financial intermediation. Determining the volume 
of actual involvement encountered insurmountable methodological obstacles. For 
the order-of-magnitude estimation, we used domestic responses to the Eurostat 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). As to the spatial delimitation, 
the settlement-level data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) and 
the district-level data from the Central Credit Information System (CCIS) were used.
The study is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the aggregate data 
on the basis of which unmet credit demand can be identified in Hungary today, 
complemented by the main findings of the Hungarian academic literature on usury 
1  For debt cap rules in force, see Annex 1.
2  The ways of receiving information in which the issue is approached by anthropological methods and field-
work are also limited; moreover, in the case of these qualitative, local studies, research ethical dilemmas 
also arise in connection with the publication of the results (Durst 2017).
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lending and two significant barriers to connection to the banking system: lack of 
institutional trust and of access to services. This is followed by two sections that 
present the data and methods used in the research, as well as the results. First, 
Section 3 provides an order-of-magnitude estimation of vulnerable households 
potentially exposed to ad hoc usury lending, and then Section 4 provides an 
estimation of the spatial location of widespread usury lending that is rife in the local 
community. The latter results are validated by crime statistics. Finally, we summarise 
the main findings as well as the possibilities and limitations of further research.
2. Background – Sources of unmet credit demand based on official 
statistics and academic literature
According to the information provided by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
(HCSO 2017), the establishment of internationally standardised indicators of poverty 
and, in a broader sense, of social exclusion (Laeken indicator system) dates back to 
the 2000s. In this process, it has become a common view that, in addition to income, 
dimensions of exclusion, such as material well-being or the labour market situation, 
fundamentally determine the quality of life. Based on these, partial indicators 
capturing the proportion of those at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) are:
1.  proportion of people living in relative income poverty,3
2.  proportion of people living in severe material deprivation,4
3.  proportion of people living in households with very low work intensity (poverty 
at work).5
Based on the latest data for 2018 (HCSO 2019), in Hungary, the proportion of 
the relative income poor is 12 per cent, the proportion of people living in severe 
material deprivation is 9 per cent and the proportion of households with very low 
work intensity is 4 per cent – as a result of this, the proportion of those at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion in Hungary is 19 per cent (Figure 1).
3  Relative income poor: those with incomes below the relative poverty line. Relative poverty line: 60 per cent 
of the median national equivalent net household income in a given year. (In 2018, in the case of a single-
person household, HUF 1,120,000 per year, in the case of 2 adults with 2 children, HUF 2,351,000.)
4  If at least four of the following nine points are true, then the household can be identified as deprived: 1. 
cannot afford to face unexpected expenses; 2. incapable to afford paying for one week annual holiday away 
from home; 3. cannot afford to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; 4. cannot afford a meat, chicken 
or fish meal every other day; 5. cannot afford to keep their home adequately warm. For financial reasons, 
the household is forced to give up 6. the washing machine, 7. the colour television, 8. the telephone, 9. 
the car for personal use.
5  Very low work intensity: working-age members of the household spend less than 20 per cent of their 
potential working time at work.
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By socio-demographic factors, the HCSO (2019) notes that younger people, those 
with up to primary education, the unemployed, households with children (especially 
single-parent households), those living in villages, the Roma minority, and, on 
a territorial basis, the residents of Northern Hungary region are more at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion.
Those living in severe material deprivation – because of their very poor situation 
– would obviously seek to end it by increasing their consumption if they had the 
opportunity to do so. At the same time, households facing borrowing constraints 
may come from among those characterised by very low work intensity and income 
poverty, as they may lack sufficient and verifiable income for bank borrowing in 
this segment. Accordingly, these are the strata which has an unmet credit demand 
vis-a-vis the formal financial intermediary system, and therefore resort to informal 
or even illegal interpersonal lending.
2.1. Findings of the academic literature
The patterns of cash management of people living in poverty differ significantly 
from the behaviour of other social groups, as they have access to other tools, 
which also necessarily means more limited space for opportunities. According to 
Figure 1
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Gosztonyi (2018), Frits Bouman6 created the context in which the financial 
transactions of the poor are embedded, which, he believes, are characterised by 
small-scale approach (low amounts of credit coupled with low incomes, savings), 
high risk, and strong relationship dependency.
Due to their specific cash management, low-income households are typically weakly 
connected to the traditional financial intermediation system: they contact informal 
financial intermediaries when necessary, one of the most significant forms of which 
is usury. The term usury refers to loans granted on an informal basis for which the 
debtor has to pay disproportionately high interest. In colloquial usage, it is still 
described as “money with interest”, referring to the extremely high interest portion 
of the loan product.
In economically underdeveloped areas, the main source of income for households 
is social transfers. Unemployment and the number of inactives are typically high. 
The additional income, which represents 22–24 per cent of their total income, 
comes from casual work, such as farm work, construction, scrap-iron and wood 
collection, or fruit and mushroom picking (Messing – Molnár 2011). Due to their low 
income levels, these households are financially extremely vulnerable, and therefore, 
an unexpected expenditure can jeopardise a family’s livelihood. In this position 
of vulnerability, they are forced to take out usury loans. On the one hand, these 
households typically do not have a banking relation, and on the other hand, their 
family and friends live in similarly difficult conditions, and so in most cases, in the 
absence of alternative solutions, they choose to take out usury loans.
Seminal foreign authors on the topic, Collins et al. (2009), point out that informal 
financial intermediation adversely affects clients in several ways compared to the 
formal institutional system. For example, market liquidity is unpredictable, there is 
no consumer protection regulation, trade secrets are not taken into account, there 
is a lack of contractual transparency and, consequently, local norms and trust play 
a greater (almost exclusive) role than the market.
In most cases, the individuals lending usury are local inhabitants who lend with 
a maturity of 1–2 months at interest rates of 50–100 per cent. The transaction 
is not recorded in writing, and aggression is also used above a certain amount 
(about HUF 50,000) in the collection of claims. The usurer is definitely trying to 
collect the debt, but does not aim to fully recover his claim. It is important for him 
to maintain a dependency relationship (Béres – Lukács, 2008). Those affected by 
usury typically live in large families (more than 4 people per household), in poor 
housing conditions, with poor public utilities and limited access to transportation 
6  Bouman, F. (1990): Informal Rural Finance – An Aladdin’s Lamp of Information. Sociologia Ruralis, 30(2): 
155–173.
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services. They are characterised by low levels of education and persistent, long-term 
unemployment (Hüse et al. 2008).
Usury is typically justified by one-off exceptional expenses (e.g. cost of medicines, 
home renovation), but it is also common for money to be used to meet basic needs, 
in which case the usury loan has to be re-borrowed from time to time. In addition, 
the causes include funding addictions (alcohol, gambling). Seasonality can also be 
observed in usury lending, namely, much more debt is accumulated in winter, which 
decreases significantly in summer. This phenomenon is strongly related to casual 
work opportunities and the heating season (Gosztonyi 2018).
In Hungary, the vast majority of usury borrowers are Roma, but several studies show 
that this is not determined by ethnicity, but rather by the unfavourable situation 
(Messing 2006, Béres – Lukács 2008, Messing – Molnár 2011, Gosztonyi 2018). 
Poverty, therefore, determines usury, so efforts to eliminate it should potentially 
focus on eradicating poverty.
The population potentially affected by usury, thus, comes from the poor strata, 
where acute emergencies often develop. In these cases, fast-access, possibly 
continuously renewable borrowing plays an important role. This brings us to the 
question of what causes broad social groups to be excluded from the financial 
intermediation system. Before income constraints, we briefly examine two factors 
that explain the lack of banking relations: the willingness and ability constraints of 
financial inclusion.
2.2. Two potential components in the lack of banking relation: trust and access
In Hungary, about 25 per cent of the population does not have a banking relation, 
i.e. they do not have a bank account,7 and therefore, they cannot make use of the 
opportunities provided by financial products, interest-bearing savings and credit. 
There may be a number of reasons behind this, which can be broken down into 
factors of willingness (trust) and ability (access).
Public trust in the banking system was undermined around the world by the 2008 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, according to the World Values Survey’s research in 60 
countries conducted between 2010 and 2014, more than half of the population in 
many countries trusts banks. Although Hungary did not participate in this research, 
significant regional differences can be seen, which can provide an indication of 
the international positioning of the domestic situation. The highest level of trust 
characterises the Far East, followed by African and Middle Eastern states, then South 
America, Australia and the United States and at the end of the row are the European 
countries participating in the survey (Figure 2). Thus, in international comparison, 
7  Based on 2017 data from the World Bank Global Findex Database.
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Hungary is probably one of the countries characterised by low trust in the banking 
system. Nevertheless, according to a 2019 survey by the Central Bank of Hungary 
(Magyar Nemzeti Bank, MNB), one quarter of the Hungarian population generally 
does not trust banks at all (Figure 3).
Figure 2
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Also based on this survey we know that general institutional trust in the banking 
system is the lowest among the elderly, among those with primary education and 
in the Northern Great Plain region.
With regard to access to the banking system, it is worth noting that currently there 
are few ATMs in operation that allow both cash withdrawals and cash deposits. 
Thus, if a person, who does not receive their income on a bank account, wishes 
to be a customer of a bank in connection with savings or loan repayments, then 
administration and regular payment for them can be done by visiting the nearest 
bank branch.8 Therefore, access to the financial institutional system is indicated in 
the context of whether at least one bank or savings cooperative has a branch in 
a given settlement.
8  Alternatively, a Posta bank account opened at the Hungarian Post Office (Magyar Posta) could also be used, 
but this can be managed in person only at 230 post offices. Although according to the HCSO (2018), 76 per 
cent of the population frequently uses the Internet and 54 per cent of them are used to banking online, 
currently at least the first borrowing requires personal presence. Fully online solutions are mostly available 
for existing customers.
Figure 3
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Based on this, significant spatial inequalities emerge. Overall, 78 per cent of 
Hungarian settlements do not have a branch, but while in Central Hungary and at the 
Southern Great Plain access is provided almost everywhere, in Northern Hungary 
and Veszprém, Somogy, Zala and Vas counties access is only possible in the largest 
cities. This also means that, especially in the Western and Southern Transdanubia 
region, but also in Nógrád and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén counties, it can be 
a significant problem that, while rural transport infrastructure is not flexible enough 
to reach larger settlements, no financial infrastructure is built locally (Figure 4). 
Instead of setting up bank branches, which significantly increase the operating costs 
of banks, in these areas the improvement of access to finance could be promoted 
not only by the spread of digital, cashless solutions, but also by the whitening 
of the economy, which, however, goes beyond the scope of the present study.
In the following, we present the results of our order-of-magnitude and spatial 
estimation regarding the Hungarian population potentially affected by usury 
lending. It is important to emphasise that the order-of-magnitude estimation refers 
to the proportion of households potentially affected by usury due to vulnerability, 
at least on an ad-hoc basis, while the spatial estimation is focused on settlements 
where usury lending is likely to be more widespread based on the aggregate data 
Figure 4
Location of settlements with bank branches
Note: Settlements shown in dark blue are those where no bank or saving cooperative has a branch 
(based on December 2019 data).
Source: MNB
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of settlements and districts. In the absence of direct data sources, our study only 
covers indirect estimations, and therefore, our possibilities for validation are limited.
3. Magnitude of the population potentially affected by usury – based 
on micro-level data
Since no specific data are available for financially vulnerable groups potentially 
exposed to informal financial intermediation, to identify the target group we used 
the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC), which was 
conducted with the participation of 8,142 Hungarian households.9 The survey 
contains questions relevant to our study, as they include, among other things the 
size and structure of income and expenditure,10 relative financial status, living 
conditions (housing conditions), financial conditions (existence of loans), as well 
as banking relation (existence of bank account).
First, we identified those households for which the declared expenditures exceed 
the declared incomes (negative income gap), as in their case, there is a high 
likelihood of demand for – primarily liquidity – loans. In the case of 34 per cent 
of the households in the sample, a monthly deficit can be observed in this sense. 
At the same time, given that households are likely to overstate their expenditures 
but understate their incomes, we also found it necessary to examine additional 
vulnerability indicators.
On the basis of intuition and literature experience, the following factors were 
selected from the indicators included in the survey to determine vulnerability:
(1)  The household cannot afford an unexpected expense amounting to HUF 70,000 
and pay it using its own resources.
(2)  None of the household members has a bank account.
(3)  In the preceding twelve months of the data collection, the household has been 
in arrears – i.e. has been unable to pay rent / utility bills / mortgage payments 
on time – due to financial difficulties, two or more times.
(4)  – (5) The subjective income situation of the household is unfavourable (two 
indicators): 1) The household is able to make ends meet, namely, to pay for its 
usual necessary expenses with great difficulty or with difficulty, and 2) it places 
its own income situation in the lower three deciles.
9  Data for 2016 recorded in 2017.
10  Time management for the income and expenditure side was different: income was household income for 
2016, whereas expenditures were for “an average month”, in the assessment of which the months closer 
to the survey could have been given more weight.
117
An Estimation of the Magnitude and Spatial Distribution of Usury Lending
(6)  The household lives in unfavourable housing conditions: there is no indoor flush 
toilet in the dwelling, or it is shared; or there is no shower unit or a bathtub in 
the dwelling, or it is shared; or they are unable to keep their home adequately 
warm; or there is no running water in the dwelling.
Based on the individual indicators, a mixed picture emerges: 9 to 42 per cent of 
the sample can be considered vulnerable (Table 1). According to the lack of bank 
account, which is a particularly important factor for our analysis, a large proportion 
(28 per cent) of the respondents are unbanked. Lack of payments due to financial 
difficulties occur in the smallest proportion, because presumably, one of the top 
priorities is that the household does not have housing-related debt. Difficulty 
in making ends meet, however, shows an unexpectedly high rate of 42 per cent 
frequency in the sample, but this may also be accompanied by a tendency to an 
overly negative perception.
Table 1
Proportion of vulnerable households in the sample according to the individual 
indicators 
Vulnerability indicators Proportion of vulnerable 
 households in the total sample 
(%)
Household has been in arrears – i.e. has been unable to pay rent /  
utility bills / mortgage payments on time – due to financial 
difficulties, two or more times 
8.9
Household lives in unfavourable housing conditions 12.9
Household places its own income situation in the lower three 
deciles
18.4
None of the household members has a bank account 28.3
Household cannot afford an unexpected expense amounting to 
70,000 HUF and pay it through its own resources
33.9
Household is able to make ends meet, namely, to pay for its usual 
necessary expenses with great difficulty or with difficulty
41.9
Source: Calculations are based on EU-SILC data
In our view, however, the disadvantageous situation shown by an indicator in itself 
does not necessarily mean that the household is vulnerable. We believe that the 
likelihood of vulnerability increases in parallel with the increase of the number of 
vulnerability characteristics. Consequently, we looked at how the households in 
the sample are distributed according to the number of vulnerability indicators that 
characterise them (Figure 5). At least one of the vulnerability indicators appears 
in 63 per cent of the households, and then with the increase of the number of 
indicators the share decreases.
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The next step was to determine which households should be considered vulnerable 
according to the number of vulnerability indicators, i.e. how many vulnerability 
indicators must co-exist in order for a given household to be considered vulnerable. 
To determine this, we went back again to the academic literature: we examined the 
expenditure structure of vulnerable households, for which the survey provided an 
adequate basis, as it contained data by main expenditure category. For households 
grouped by the number of vulnerability indicators, Table 2 presents the median of 
the ratio of the given expenditure category within total expenditures.
Table 2
Typical share of household expenditures (per cent) by the number of vulnerability 
indicators
Number  
of vulnera-
bility  
indicators
Food Alcohol,  
cigarettes
Clothing
Housing  
costs Health
Transpor- 
tation
Communi- 
cations Culture Education
Catering  
services
0 23.2 2.6 3.4 23.6 3.9 12.4 7.3 5.0 1.8 4.8
1 27.2 3.3 2.6 27.0 5.4 11.2 7.0 3.9 1.5 4.9
2 28.5 3.5 2.1 29.6 5.6 9.4 6.3 3.4 1.4 5.4
3 28.6 4.6 2.0 30.2 5.9 8.4 6.1 3.5 1.4 5.7
4 31.0 4.4 1.8 31.0 5.3 5.2 5.8 3.6 1.2 4.8
5 33.5 6.5 1.7 31.7 5.6 4.5 4.8 3.4 0.7 4.7
6 31.8 7.2 1.2 36.3 4.3 4.9 4.3 4.2 0.9 6.2
Note: For households grouped by the number of vulnerability indicators, we present the medians of the 
ratio of the given expenditure category within the total expenditure.
Source: Calculations are based on EU-SILC data
Figure 5
Distribution of households by number of vulnerability indicators
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On the one hand, the results confirm what is set out in the academic literature. 
It is apparent that the more vulnerable a household is, the larger the share of 
expenditures it spends on food, alcohol, tobacco and housing, with a subsequent 
reduction in the share of clothing and especially transportation expenditures. 
On the other hand, they also provide an indication, according to the number of 
vulnerability indicators, as to between which groups we should draw the line 
regarding households considered vulnerable. In the case of food and transportation 
expenditure category indicators, which we consider crucial, it can be seen that, 
disregarding the differences between households without a vulnerability indicator 
and those with one vulnerability indicator, the largest change in expenditure shares 
appears among the households characterised by three and four vulnerability 
indicators. Consequently, under these criteria, households that can be considered 
to be in a disadvantageous position according to at least any four of our six 
vulnerability indicators were considered vulnerable. These households make up 
13 per cent of the total sample. As a conservative estimate, we also examined 
households that additionally have a negative income gap, as we assume that they 
are likely to be even more disadvantaged financially. Defined in this way, 4.3 per 
cent of the households are vulnerable.
Given that our analysis focuses on which households are outside the realm of 
banking system, we also examined how the number of vulnerability indicators is 
distributed among the households without a bank account (that is 28 per cent of 
the total sample) (Figure 6). In this case as well, those households with at least 
four vulnerability indicators were considered vulnerable (one of these indicators, 
by definition, is the lack of bank account). We found that around 29 per cent of 
those without a bank account, i.e. 8 per cent of the total sample, are in the group 
of those who are potentially exposed to usury lending, at least on an ad-hoc basis. 
Taking the common intersection with the negative income gap as the lower limit, 
we arrived at a figure of 3 per cent of the households. It should be emphasised, 
however, that even though a household is vulnerable, we have no information on 
its specific financial coping strategy (family, friends, employer loan, usury).
Thus, using the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions with 
respect to the order-of-magnitude of the Hungarian population potentially affected 
by usury lending, we concluded that 3–13 per cent of the Hungarian population is 
exposed to this risk, which, due to the high costs, can easily lead to spiralling debt 
problems, based on the academic literature. In the following, we present a spatial 
estimate of potential impact, based on a different data source.
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4. Areas potentially affected by usury – based on aggregate data
In Hungary, the standard of living of the population is geographically heterogeneous. 
For this reason, in order to map informal lending, it is necessary to identify areas 
where there are limited opportunities to contact financial institutions. Our research 
examines the existence of banking relation, focusing on the most underdeveloped 
areas of the country, as the lack of banking relation may be one of the elements of 
the emergence and widespread use of usury lending in a given area.
For measuring economic underdevelopment, we considered four factors:
•  Unemployment rate (%): the number of unemployed in relation to the number 
of unemployed and employed persons.
•  Proportion of those with primary education (%): the number of people with no 
more than primary education in relation to the adult population.
•  Proportion of apartments without comfort (%): proportion of apartments that 
have at least one living room and kitchen, but do not have a bathroom and indoor 
flush toilet; water and electricity are not provided and heating is only possible 
on an individual way.
•  Overcrowding (persons / 100 rooms): Number of residents per 100 rooms to 
measure crowded housing conditions.
Figure 6
Distribution of households without a bank account according to vulnerability 
indicators
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These indicators were prepared on the basis of settlement-level data from the 2011 
census (Figure 7), and therefore they can be considered somewhat outdated. At the 
same time, due to their completeness and data quality, they can be suitable sources for 
measuring economic underdevelopment, all the more so because in less than a decade 
probably only a few settlements have significantly changed their relative status.
Figure 7
Distribution of underdevelopment indicators by settlement
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After standardisation (which was performed to eliminate the order-of-magnitude 
and dispersion deviations), the above four indicators were averaged, thus obtaining 
the value of economic-housing underdevelopment per settlement (Figure 8). The 
indicator thus obtained is a number without a unit of measurement, which is 
intended to indicate the relative state of development of the settlements. From the 
constructed economic-housing underdevelopment index, we formed four categories 
for which we used as a basis the larger changes seen in the frequency distribution 
of the indicator. In fact, we delimited the most developed and least developed 
settlements on the assumption that these groups can also be well distinguished 
from other settlements in terms of its cardinality. Thus, we identified the most 
underdeveloped 12 per cent of Hungarian settlements, where on average economic 
and housing conditions are the worst.
Based on the spatial location of the settlements, we can see that the most 
disadvantaged settlements in terms of economic-housing underdevelopment are 
located in Northern Hungary, Hajdú-Bihar and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok counties, as 
well as in the Southern Transdanubia region, whereas the majority of settlements in 
the Western Transdanubia region and in Central Hungary have the most favourable 
relative status (Figure 9). Based on the economic-housing underdevelopment index, 
7 of the 10 poorest settlements are located in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, 
and especially the tiny settlements of Cserehát are affected by the problem of 
deprivation caused by low education, employment and income.
Figure 8
Distribution of Hungarian settlements in terms of economic-housing 
underdevelopment
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In addition to the poor economic conditions, the exposure to usury lending is also 
due to the fact that the area is not sufficiently channelled into the realm of the 
banking system, and therefore, “formal” loan penetration is low. In order to take 
this into account in the analysis, we used data from the CCIS to determine the 
proportion of persons with loans at the end of 2018 relative to the total adult 
population at the district level (these data are not available at the settlement level). 
Loan penetration was considered low in districts where less than 32 per cent of the 
population had a loan (Figure 10).
Figure 9
Relative extent of economic-housing underdevelopment in Hungarian settlements
Note: The darker colour indicates more severe underdevelopment.
Source: Calculations are based on HCSO data
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Loan penetration is not directly related to economic underdevelopment: in 
Baranya, one of the most underdeveloped counties, there are districts that belong 
to the group with the highest loan penetration. In a county comparison, low loan 
penetration occurs in both the most underdeveloped (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén) 
and the most developed (Győr-Moson-Sopron) districts (Figure 11). Low loan 
penetration characterising both developed and underdeveloped districts can be 
explained by the fact that, while wealthy households can achieve their investment 
and consumption purposes without loans (and those with euro income near the 
western border can now also do so with the help of Austrian banks), those living 
in deprivation do not have access to bank loan products in the absence of banking 
relation and declared job (for low loan penetration districts, see Annex 2).
Figure 10
Distribution of Hungarian districts by loan penetration
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Based on all of this, economic-housing underdevelopment and loan penetration 
should be taken into account jointly, as they together identify the areas potentially 
affected by usury (Figure 12). These areas are therefore those where the economic-
housing underdevelopment index is above 0.8 and, at the same time, the loan 
penetration indicator is less than 32 per cent. The majority of the 64 settlements 
thus produced are located in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county. After that, Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg, Zala and Hajdú-Bihar counties are represented on a smaller scale, 
along with Baranya, Nógrád and Heves counties with 1 settlement each. Only one of 
the 64 settlements has a bank branch, which – for the reasons mentioned in Section 2 
– may also be a necessary condition for lack of connection with the formal financial 
intermediary system. These settlements, which are presumably more interwoven 
with the local community, and thus on the whole are more exposed to usury, are 
home to about 40,000 people, representing 0.43 per cent of the total population.11
11  This does not mean that there is no usury lending in the more developed settlements, as it also occurs in 
large cities, even in Budapest, but these settlements, due to their aggregate development indicators, are 
not included in the results of such a macro approach estimate.
Figure 11
Loan penetration in Hungarian districts
High loan penetration (above 38%)
Medium loan penetration (between 32%–38%)
Low loan penetration (below 32%)
Note: Loan penetration is the number of active loans contracts at the end of 2018 relative to the total 
population.
Source: Based on MNB (CCIS) data
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Our possibilities for direct backtesting to validate our spatial results are limited, but 
based on crime statistics, we can get some indication in this regard.
The crime of usury as a criminal offence entered into force on 1 March 2009.12 
According to the available data, the number of – reported – crimes of usury was 
rather limited until 2011, however, this may not only be due to the actual low 
incidence of violations (Figure 13). This is also suggested by the fact that between 
2011 and 2012, the number of registered crimes of usury increased significantly, 
more than tripled, which may have been partly due to the tightening of usury 
regulations in 2011: indeed, Act CXXXIV of 2011 amending various laws related to 
usury enhanced the punishment for criminal usury and also expanded the scope 
of punishable offences.
Until the amendment of the law, the crime of usury was deemed to exist if someone 
took advantage of the victim’s needy situation, by contracting a deal in a business 
pattern that contained particularly disproportionate consideration, the fulfilment 
of which exposed the victim or his / her relative to serious or further deprivation. 
Business pattern in this wording meant that the perpetrator is engaged in criminal 
12  See Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code, Section 330/A, modified by Act CXV of 2008. In addition to the 
Criminal Code, civil law also regulates usury: since its entry into force in May 1960, the Civil Code has stated 
that a usury contract shall be deemed to exist if, at the time of concluding the contract, the contracting 
party stipulates a conspicuously disproportionate advantage, knowing and exploiting the situation of the 
other party. 
Figure 12
Estimation results settlements exposed to usury lending
Note: The darker shade indicates settlements potentially exposed to usury.
Source: Calculations are based on MNB and HCSO data
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activities of the same or similar character to generate profits on a regular basis. 
Due to that clause, however, a person who entered into an agreement containing 
particularly disproportionate consideration on a single occasion was not punishable. 
Following amendment of the law, the perpetrator became punishable even if 
he / she committed the above offence only once. Another enhancement is that 
while previously the offence committed in a business pattern was punishable by 
imprisonment for up to three years under the law, following the amendment even 
a five-year prison term can be prescribed. It also facilitates the detection of crimes 
that the court can mitigate the punishment in an unlimited way if the perpetrator 
reports the crime of usury to the authority before it becomes known to the authority.
From 2013, the number of registered crimes of usury started to decline again, as 
in that year the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights called on the government 
to set up a complex crisis management service (Office of the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights, 2013).13 At the same time, the improvement is partly statistical 
and can be traced back to the emergence of newer, less clear forms of usury (e.g. 
food usury, see Béres, 2015).
13  “Under current practice, victim assistance includes enforcement of the victim’s interests, providing instant 
financial aid as well as legal aid. However, it is a general experience that, due to strict legal rules, victims 
of usury cannot receive either instant financial aid or compensation. The service can typically assist them 
with information. In order to increase the effectiveness of victim assistance, the Commissioner, therefore, 
proposed that the Minister of Public Administration and Justice in cooperation with the Minister of the 
Interior and the Minister for Human Resources initiate the establishment of a crisis management service 
to assist victims of criminal usury in a complex way (…)” (Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights 2013: p. 63).
Figure 13
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In order to validate our results, we compared the regional distribution of registered 
crimes of usury with the spatial distribution of potential involvement revealed on 
the basis of our own research (Table 3). The distribution of reported crimes shows 
a similar picture to what we found. Based on the officially registered data, similarly 
to our results, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties have 
the highest involvement: 28 per cent of the crimes of usury registered between 
2013 and 2018 took place in the former county and 19 per cent in the latter one, 
while 53 per cent of the 64 settlements we identified are in Borsod county and 17 
per cent are in Szabolcs county. In our research, however, we also identified 10 
settlements in Zala as exposed to usury, but the official crime statistics do not show 
the county involvement. By contrast, according to crime statistics, Jász-Nagykun-
Szolnok is the third most affected county, while according to our research, none of 
the potentially affected settlements with the lowest loan penetration and the most 
significant economic-housing underdevelopment are located in this county. In the 
fourth place is Hajdú-Bihar county, which is also in line with our settlement-level 
results, and therefore, the absence of Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county is likely to be 
due to the obsolescence of settlement-level underdevelopment data.
Table 3
Number and distribution of crimes of usury registered by county
County Total number of crimes of usury 
registered between 2013 and 
2018
Distribution of crimes of usury 
registered between 2013 and 
2018 (%)
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 183 27.9
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 122 18.6
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 66 10.1
Hajdú-Bihar 64 9.8
Nógrád 50 7.6
Pest 37 5.6
Bács-Kiskun 26 4.0
Budapest 22 3.4
Heves 21 3.2
Békés 19 2.9
Somogy 18 2.7
Komárom-Esztergom 8 1.2
Csongrád 6 0.9
Baranya 5 0.8
Veszprém 4 0.6
Fejér 3 0.5
Vas 2 0.3
Győr-Moson-Sopron 0 0.0
Tolna 0 0.0
Zala 0 0.0
Source: Prosecution Service (2018), Ministry of Interior Criminal Statistics System
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5. Conclusions
Overall, based on our results, we estimate the proportion of vulnerable households 
at between 3 and 13 per cent by setting an estimation band. In other words, 
according to our estimate, in Hungary, out of 4 million households – as reported in 
2016 – the number of households that, due to their vulnerability, may be exposed 
to informal financial intermediation and may create potential demand for such 
financial services is between 113,000 and 523,000. However, in the absence of 
direct data, the extent of usury lending is difficult to measure, and therefore in our 
analysis we mapped the possible order-of-magnitude of the problem.
Based on the data at the settlement and district level, we also made an estimate 
of which settlements usury lending may be widespread in. Our results show that 
settlements in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Hajdú-Bihar 
counties close to the country border may be affected. The involvement of these 
areas is in line with the county-by-county breakdown list of crime statistics.
More detailed research on usury lending is hampered by a number of factors. Due to 
its hidden nature, administrative data collection is not carried out by definition, and 
the debts are registered informally by the lenders. Due to the spatial concentration 
indicated by the academic literature, the illegality of lending activity and the 
intimidation used as a workout strategy, even the quantitative questionnaire surveys 
cannot give a real picture of the role of usury lending in Hungary. The studies in the 
academic literature use qualitative methodological tools: interviews, focus groups, 
and participatory action research are used to map the ways of money management 
and acquiring funding in a given settlement.
Over the longer term, the credit demand of the household exposed to informal 
lending cannot be met by the bank credit market; this is not possible due to the 
prudential regulation and the business model. Before taking measures to eliminate 
usury lending, the regulator needs to map the circumstances and motivations of 
those involved through on-site research, as a stronger reduction of usury by legal 
means alone will not provide a solution regarding the funding needs of those who 
resort to it. Given that this range of the population can be considered vulnerable 
in several respects, policy steps to eradicate the problem should include targeted 
territorial and housing subsidies as well as promoting access to financial services, 
in particular through digital channels, and financial education.
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Annexes
Annex 1: Development of debt cap rules in Hungary
In order to mitigate the risks arising from household excessive indebtedness, the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Decree No. 32/2014. IX. 10. (debt cap rules) that entered 
into force on 1 January 2015, limited the maximum size of the debt service-to-
income ratio (DSTI) and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) in household lending by 
financial intermediaries.
The debt cap rules are to be applied when determining the instalments of debt 
arising from non-business credit, loan and lease contracts required for individuals. 
The DSTI limits the maximum debt service burdens that may be undertaken when 
taking out a new loan in the given proportion to the customers’ regular income, 
thereby reducing customer indebtedness. When calculating, the amount of the 
monthly instalment shall be divided by the amount of the proven monthly net 
income. In the case of co-debtors, the proven monthly net incomes can be added 
together. The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) limits the maximum amount of credit that 
may be taken up relative to collateral (real estate value) in the case of secured loans 
(such as mortgage loans).
Levels of domestic DSTI and LTV limits
HUF EUR
Other 
currency
D
ST
I Monthly net income below HUF 400,000 50% 25% 10%
Monthly net income at least HUF 400,000 60% 30% 15%
LT
V For mortgage loan 80% 50% 35%
For auto loan 75% 45% 30%
Note: Applicable from 1 January 2015 to 1 October 2018.
Source: MNB
From 1 October 2018, the MNB, in order to encourage the expansion of mortgage 
lending with longer interest rate fixation periods, amended the debt cap rules by 
the MNB Decree No. 29/2018. VIII. 21. Under the new regulation, debt service-to-
income ratios differentiated by interest rate fixation period have been determined.
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Debt service-to-income ratio by interest rate fixation period
 Interest rate fixation period
Monthly net income Less than 5 years At least 5 years but 
less than 10 years
At least 10 years or 
fixed for the whole 
term
Below HUF 400,000 (HUF 
500,000 from 1 July 2019)
25% 35% 50%
At least HUF 400,000 (HUF 
500,000 from 1 July 2019)
30% 40% 60%
Note: Applicable since 1 October 2018.
Source: MNB
Borrowers with a higher level of income will still be allowed to borrow with higher 
monthly instalments due to their higher debt repayment capacity. From 1 July 
2019, considering also to the increase in wages, the Decree allows to undertake 
higher instalments at or above HUF 500,000 of monthly net income (MNB Decree 
No. 24/2019. VI. 26.).
Annex 2: Districts with low penetration of loan products by county
Bács-Kiskun
Bácsalmás
Baja
Kalocsa
Kiskőrös
Kiskunmajsa
Győr-Moson-Sopron
Csorna
Kapuvár
Mosonmagyaróvár
Sopron
Hajdú-Bihar
Derecske
Nyíradony
Baranya
Pécsvárad
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén
Edelény
Gönc
Mezőkövesd
Sárospatak
Tokaj
Heves
Bélapátfalva
Nógrád
Balassagyarmat
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg
Csenger
Nyírbátor
Csongrád
Kistelek
Mórahalom
 
Zala
Keszthely
Lenti
Letenye
Source: MNB
